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Parties and Interests in the ‘Marriage of Iron
and Rye’
CHERYL SCHONHARDT-BAILEY
This article analyses Imperial Germany’s legendary coalition of landed aristocracy and heavy
industry around a policy of tariff protection. Using a simple model of voting behaviour, where
party affiliation serves as a partial intervening variable between constituency interests and
legislative votes on trade policy, I test hypotheses derived from three different interpretations of
the ‘marriage of iron and rye’. Roll-call votes from four key divisions in the Reichstag are
analysed in a number of forms, ranging from cross-tabulations to conditional logistic regression.
Ronald Rogowksi’s ‘factor endowment’ model offers an important dynamic perspective that is
lacking in the others, but his model must be reconciled with anomalies that arise in the short run.
Rather than attempting to disentangle political party ideology from constituents’ interests, more
insight may be gained from understanding why the effects of the two causal factors were not fixed,
and how they varied over time.
Perhaps one of the most studied coalitions of diverse economic interests is
Germany’s ‘marriage of iron and rye’, in which heavy industry and the large
agricultural estate owners of east Elbian Prussia (the Junkers) coalesced around
a tariff policy for both industrial and agricultural imports. Two parallel events
– the Great Depression (c.1873–c.1896) and a rapid growth in foreign grain
imports in the mid-1870s – created economic insecurity for the coal and steel
interests and the grain-producing landed estates, respectively. The shift to
protection with the Tariff Law of 1879 cemented an alliance which for some
commentators continued through the first decade of the twentieth century. This
article examines the ‘marriage’ with two purposes. First, three interests-based
interpretations are presented: (1) a compromise between unequals, in which the
Junkers asserted their authoritarian influence over the politically backward
industrialists; (2) a recurring convergence of interests, driven and punctuated
by conflict between classes, religions, industries and regions; and (3) a coalition
of owners of scarce factors of production, joined and separated by structural
* Comments on a previous version of this article from Andrew Bailey, Jim Cassing, Jeffrey
Frieden, Carsten Hefeker, Arye Hillman, Stephanie Hoopes, Adam Klug, Rainer Klump, Achim
Ko¨rber, David Lake, Timothy McKeown, Robert Pahre, Ronald Rogowski, and audiences at the
Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy, University of Wu¨rzburg, Nuffield College, Oxford, and
University of Pittsburgh, are very much appreciated. In addition. Michael Alvarez, Lars-Erik
Cederman, John Conybeare, Jim Harrigan, Steve Husted, Colin Mills and Danny Quah provided
advice on the methodology. Jojo Iwasaki, Gita Subrahmanyam and the late Dorothea Smith provided
me with valuable research assistance.
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changes in Germany’s economy.1 Hypotheses derived from these interpreta-
tions are tested, giving particular attention to areas where the three disagree. I
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the interpretations by analysing
statistically the relationships between constituency interests and the party
affiliation of their representatives, and then the combined effects of party
affiliation and constituency interests on voting behaviour in the Reichstag.
Because advanced statistical analysis of four historic divisions associated with
the marriage – the 1879 Tariff Law, the 1893 Romanian Treaty, the 1894
Russian Treaty, and the 1902 Tariff Law – is unprecedented (as far as I know),
this study provides a first step towards formally testing some of the contradictory
interpretations of this important coalition. The findings suggest that economic
interests, shaped by changes in Germany’s relative factor endowment,
adequately capture the long-run dimension of the marriage, but in the short run,
political–ideological factors cannot be ignored.
A second purpose of this article is to contribute a historical perspective to the
‘ideology versus interests’ debate in the literature on legislative behaviour. It
is generally accepted that the 1879 tariff marked a watershed in Imperial German
politics: ‘It signified the disappearance of parties grounded upon political
principle and ushered in a new era, in which parties were to act as the agents
of specific economic interests’.2 Political party ideology, it is argued, gave way
to pressure group politics. Statistical analysis of roll-call votes on trade policy
in the Reichstag provides a useful, if difficult, test of this proposition. Recent
work highlights serious difficulties in attempting to disentangle empirically the
relative effects of ideology and economic interests on roll-call votes.3 As yet no
general agreement exists on the ‘proper’ method for measuring the effects of
constituents’ ideological predispositions, their economic interests, and the
ideological predispositions of representatives (and how this translates into party
affiliation). Rather than attempting to disentangle ideology from interests, the
strategy adopted here is to examine the overlap between these two causal agents.
1 Elsewhere I examine a fourth ‘statist’ interpretation (‘Sorting the Wheat from the Chaff: The
“Marriage of Iron and Rye” Revisited’, unpublished working paper, London School of Economics
and Political Science, 1994).
2 Dan S. White, The Splintered Party: National Liberalism in Hessen and the Reich 1867–1918
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 11.
3 Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, ‘On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and
Shirking’, Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5–20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, ‘The Apparent
Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal–Agent Slack in Political Institutions’,
Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103–32; Kalt and Zupan, ‘Capture and Ideology in the
Economic Theory of Politics’, American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279–300; Keith Krehbiel,
‘Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences’, Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21–38; Sam
Peltzman, ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’, Journal of Law and Economics, 27
(1984), 181–210; Sam Peltzman, ‘An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional
Voting in the Twentieth Century’, American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656–75; Keith T. Poole,
‘Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress’, Legislative Studies
Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117–33.
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THE ‘MARRIAGE’
In the early 1870s rapid advances in transportation coupled with increased
competition in world grain markets from more efficient Russian and American
farmers meant that German Junkers, who were formerly net exporters of grain,
became producers who had to compete with imports.4 At about the same time,
the Great Depression squeezed the profitability of industrial firms.5 Because
many of these firms were newly created, or had recently expanded during the
previous boom years, the problem of excess capacity in the domestic market was
severe – and made worse with the integration into the Zollverein of the
Alsace-Lorraine iron, steel and cotton spinning industries. Reductions in iron
and steel tariffs (1873) and the complete abolition of the pig iron tariff in 1877
helped to mobilize heavy industry against Germany’s free-trade orientation.
Grain producers and heavy industrialists, up to then suspicious adversaries,
converged upon a common interest in protectionism. The tariff of 1879 enacted
this policy shift into legislation.
In the 1880s there were two further increases in agricultural tariffs, while
industrial tariffs remained virtually constant.6 By the early 1890s, real and
potential retaliation from Germany’s trading partners convinced German
industry of the need to take measures to regain (and expand) export markets.
Between 1891 and 1894, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s successor, Leo von
Caprivi, negotiated numerous foreign trade agreements that effectively
exchanged lower German tariffs on agriculture for reductions in foreign tariffs
on German industrial goods. As Caprivi’s treaties approached their expiration,
Chancellor Bernhard von Bu¨low introduced the ‘general tariff’ in 1902, thereby
signalling a resumption of high agricultural tariffs.7
In brief, the years 1879, 1891–94 and 1902 exhibit policy shifts from free
trade to protection, to freer trade, then back to protection. The next section,
which tests competing interpretations of the marriage, analyses Reichstag
deputies’ roll-call votes for four divisions—two motions for higher tariffs (the
1879 and 1902 autonomous Tariff Laws) and two for lower tariffs (the 1893
Romanian and the 1894 Russian trade treaties). Of the Caprivi trade agreements,
4 Ivo Nikolai Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868–1879 (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1963).
5 David Blackbourn, ‘The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in
the Nineteenth Century’, in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, eds, The Peculiarities of German
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of
Germany 1815–1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Timothy James McKeown, ‘The Rise and
Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century’ (doctoral dissertation, Stanford
University, 1982), chap. 8; Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarchzeit (Berlin, 1967).
6 Sarah Rebecca Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall: The Formation of the
Farmers’ League (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 74–7.
7 Percy Ashley, Modern Tariff History: Germany–United States–France (London: John Murray,
1920), p. 86.
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the Romanian and Russian treaties were of greatest significance. Both the
agricultural and industrial lobbies considered the 1893 Romanian Treaty to be
the most important of the ‘small treaties’ negotiated by Caprivi (with Romania,
Spain and Serbia).8 For the iron and textile manufacturers, exports to Romania
were estimated at 100 million marks, whereas Spanish exports were 40–50
million and Serbian only several million. In contrast, Romania provided about
10 per cent of Germany’s wheat imports and about 7 per cent of rye imports.
Since Romania imposed no tariff on Russian grain imports, the agrarians feared
that lower tariffs on Romanian grain would lead to a ‘flood’ of Russian rye into
Germany.9 The 1894 Russian Treaty was also crucial to both lobbies. Ten years
of poor trade relations between Russia and Germany had culminated in a trade
war in the early 1890s, precipitating fears ‘that an actual war might result if a
better understanding was not achieved at once’.10 Heavy industrialists lobbied
hard for passage of the treaty, while the agrarians lobbied forcefully against it.
The agrarians were particularly sensitive since Russia was by far Germany’s
leading supplier of grain, providing 31 per cent of wheat imports and 67 per cent
of rye imports in the early 1890s.11
The Marriage as a Compromise
Studies of democratic theory and the political economy of development have
pointed to this coalition of landowners and industrialists as illustrative of the
authoritarian path to development particularly evident among late industrializ-
ers which have experienced no revolutionary break from the past. Prominent
works – which, together, constitute the ‘traditional’ interpretation – have
portrayed the coalition as a partnership of a politically dominant agrarian elite
and a politically weak, underdeveloped bourgeoisie against a rising proletar-
iat.12 The bourgeoisie is said to have accepted the political, social and
8 Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, pp. 207–47.
9 Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, pp. 21, 226–7.
10 Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, p. 254. Russian duties were increased
seven times between 1881 and 1890, resulting in a large drop in German exports to Russia. In 1891,
Russian imports to Germany were subjected to a 50 per cent tariff, while a similar tariff was placed
on German imports to Russia (pp. 82–3, 253).
11 Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, p. 21.
12 Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1943); and Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press,
1966); Eckart Kehr (ed. and trans. by Pauline R. Anderson and Eugene N. Anderson), Battleship
Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894–1901 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975);
Kehr (edited and with an introduction by Gordon A. Craig), Economic Interest, Militarism, and
Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); James R. Kurth, ‘Industrial Change
and Political Change: A European Perspective’, in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in
Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hans-Ju¨rgen Puhle, ‘Lords and
Peasants in the Kaiserreich’, in Robert G. Moeller, ed., Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany:
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ideological dominance of the agrarian elite in exchange for state support for
industrialization; that is, by compromising with the ‘aristocratic’ and ‘authori-
tarian’ large landowning elite, industrialists assimilated the same authoritarian
value system. In short, German industrialists of the nineteenth century ‘failed
to develop a sufficiently strong liberal constitutionalist backbone’ – a handicap
that plagued German political development until 1945.13
Yet, underpinning this partnership of unequals were raw economic interests
– particularly those of the Junkers. The traditional interpretation maintains that
as the Junkers began to fear lower prices from foreign grain imports, they
reversed their support for free trade in agriculture14 and pushed for protection
for German agriculture.15 ‘For industry as a whole’, Gerschenkron notes,
‘agricultural tariffs meant labour pressure for increased wages, retardation in the
flow of labour supply from agricultural districts, … and danger of retaliation on
the part of countries which supplied wide markets for the products of German
industry’.16 But for heavy industry, reciprocal tariffs on iron and steel
manufactures constituted ‘more than’ sufficient compensation, since these
tariffs created ‘a monopolistic position in the domestic market’.17 Ideally,
industrialists would have preferred industrial tariffs without agricultural
protection, but since the landowners held veto power, they learned that this was
not possible.18
Agricultural tariffs perpetuated feudalism, allowing the Junkers to benefit
from protection, whereas smaller farmers and peasants, as producers primarily
of livestock (and therefore consumers of grain for feed), suffered. Traditionalists
have some difficulty explaining why smaller farmers and peasants generally
supported agricultural protection, except to lament that they were duped into
believing that the large landowners were spokesmen for the whole of
agriculture.19 More recently, some historians have given more credit to the
rationality of peasants, arguing that they gained from restrictions on the import
(F’note continued)
Recent Studies in Agricultural History (Winchester, Hants: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
13 Geoff Eley, ‘The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German
History Before 1914’, in Blackbourn and Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, p. 43; Kitchen,
The Political Economy of Germany 1815–1914, pp. 167–8.
14 Gustav Stolper (continued by Karl Ha¨user and Knut Borchardt, trans. by Toni Stolper), The
German Economy 1870 to the Present (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), pp. 35–7.
15 Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815–1914, pp. 143–54; Lambi, Free Trade and
Protection in Germany 1868–1879, pp. 131–50.
16 Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany, p. 45.
17 Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany, pp. 45–7.
18 Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, p. 71.
19 Other traditionalists are more nuanced in their assessment of the motivations of the peasants
(David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 65; Puhle, ‘Lords and Peasants in the Kaiserreich’, p. 99).
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of livestock, and from grain tariffs themselves.20 In contrast, other historians
have rejected the notion of agrarian ‘unity’ entirely.21
Traditionalists maintain that the interests of the agrarians were further united
through the restructured Conservative party. Whereas ‘old’ German conser-
vatism was ideological in orientation, new conservatism (organized in 1876 as
the Deutsch-Konservative Partei) sought to represent the economic interests of
the land-owning aristocracy.22 By the early 1890s, in response to the threat of
the Caprivi trade reforms, militant Prussian landowners created a modern
interest group, the Farmers’ League (Bund der Landwirte). Rather than
competing with the Conservative party, the League strengthened and reformed
it by broadening the electoral support base for conservatism, particularly among
the smaller proprietors and lower-middle classes. The League appealed to
smaller farmers with a new ideology of vo¨lkisch nationalism,23 thereby
enveloping the protectionist interests of the Prussian landowners into a more
national conservative movement.
In sum, the traditional compromise interpretation of the marriage emphasizes:
(1) the shift in the late 1870s towards support for protection by the landowning
elite and the agrarian population as a whole; and (2) the role of the Conservative
party as the ‘mouthpiece’ of the agrarian interest. These two characteristics
highlight the traditional interpretation’s predominant concern with agrarian
unity, which was defined by the economic interests of the import-competing
grain-producers and was carried into the political arena by the Conservative
party. As a testable hypothesis,
HYPOTHESIS 1: Agrarian unity should be reflected in (a) agrarian regions voting
predominantly for Conservative party representatives; and (b)
deputies from agrarian regions voting for agricultural protection in
the Reichstag.
Moreover,
HYPOTHESIS 2: Conservative party delegates in the Reichstag should consistently
and uniformly support high agricultural tariffs.
20 James C. Hunt, ‘Peasants, Grain Tariffs, and Meat Quotas: Imperial German Protectionism
Reexamined’, Central European History, 7 (1974), 311–31; Robert G. Moeller, ‘Peasants and Tariffs
in the Kaiserreich: How Backward were the Bauern?’ Agricultural History, 55 (1981), 370–84;
Steven B. Webb, ‘Agricultural Protection in Wilhelminian Germany: Forging an Empire with Pork
and Rye’, Journal of Economic History, 42 (1982), 309–26.
21 John Hobson, ‘The Tax-Seeking State: Protectionism, Taxation and State Structures in
Germany, Russia, Britain, and America, 1870–1914’ (doctoral dissertation, London School of
Economics and Political Science, 1991), pp. 57–60; Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After
Bismarck’s Fall, pp. 17, 271.
22 Robert M. Berdahl, ‘Conservative Politics and Aristocratic Landholders in Bismarckian
Germany’, Journal of Modern History, 44 (1972), 1–20, p. 20; Hans-Ju¨rgen Puhle, ‘Conservatism
in Modern German History’, Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (1978), 689–720, p. 698.
23 Puhle, ‘Conservatism in Modern German History’, p. 703.
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A Divisive ‘Marriage’
It is perhaps a misnomer to claim that recent criticisms of the traditional view
(so-called ‘revisionists’) provide a single interpretation of the marriage,
particularly since some authors adhere to a Marxist perspective while others are
liberal in orientation. The common theme, however, is one of conflict and
division. Some authors stress the political ramifications of divisions within
German industry (heavy versus light, new versus old, cartelized versus
non-cartelized, and efficient versus inefficient producers).24 Others emphasize
the cultural separatism of German Catholicism (including, but not limited to the
duration of the Kulturkampf) or the hysteria of anti-socialism.25 Economic and
social divisions were further complicated by German federalism, which gave
rise to conflicts between the local and national governments, as well as between
regions.26
I focus on one key area of conflict, namely intra-industry conflict between
light (usually non-cartelized) industry and heavy (cartelized) industry. Several
revisionists, who fault the traditionalists for overstating the cohesiveness of
German industry, maintain that on tariffs it split into opposing factions. The less
concentrated sectors of the light and consumer-goods industries (leather-
working, textiles, woodworking) were forced to pay higher prices for
tariff-protected raw materials controlled by the cartelized heavy industries and
the agricultural sector.27 In 1895, these industries launched a counter-movement
to the Centralverband deutscher Industriellen (CVDI),28 the Bund der
Industriellen (BdI), thereby creating a conspicuous dichotomy between the
24 Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic; Blackbourn, ‘The Discreet Charm of the
Bourgeoisie’; David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order,
1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Eley, ‘The British Model and
the German Road’; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to
International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Lambi, Free Trade and
Protection in Germany; James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978); Frank B. Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic
Development of Germany During the Nineteenth Century (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1976); Steven B. Webb, ‘Tariffs, Cartels, Technology, and Growth in the German Steel
Industry, 1879 to 1914’, Journal of Economic History, 40 (1980), 309–29.
25 David Blackbourn, Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Ellen Lovell Evans, The German Centre Party 1870–1933
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981); Dick Geary, ‘The German
Labour Movement 1848–1919’, European Studies Review, 6 (1976) 297–330; Susanne Miller and
Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy from 1848 to the Present (Leamington
Spa, Warwicks.: Berg, 1986); Mary Nolan, Social Democracy and Society: Working Class
Radicalism in Du¨sseldorf, 1890–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
26 Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany; James J. Sheehan,
‘Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century Germany’, Past and Present, 51 (1971), 116–37;
Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century; White, The Splintered Party.
27 But see Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868–1879, pp. 17–19, 121–3.
28 For the history of the CVDI, see Gordon R. Craig, Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1981); Wolfram M. Haller, ‘Regional and National Free-Trade Associations in
Germany, 1859–79’, European Studies Review, 6 (1976), 275–96; Kitchen, The Political Economy
298 S C H O N H A R D T - B A I L E Y
organized interests of heavy and light industry. The BdI was the first major
organization to represent the liberal, free-trade-in-agriculture interests of
German light industry, although other organizations soon followed – the Central
Office for the Preparation of Commercial Treaties in 1897, the Association for
Commercial Treaties in 1900, and finally the explicitly anti-agrarian Hansabund
(Hanse Union) in 1909.
The schism between light and heavy industry became manifest in (1) class
conflict, (2) regional conflict and (3) the splintering of political parties. First,
light industries were more exposed to labour’s demands since they lacked the
monopoly power to enact a ‘self-help’ system of company paternalism.29 They
resorted both to appeals to the state for legislation on managing labour relations,
and to ad hoc firm-by-firm wage agreements. As a consequence, the Free Trade
Unions (whose national membership grew from 222,697 in 1896 to 1,446,529
in 1906)30 became deeply embedded in the less concentrated industries and
made virtually no inroads into the coal, iron, steel, chemicals and heavy
machinery industries.31
Secondly, conflicts between light and heavy industries reflected a tension
between old and new industrial regions, with the former concentrated in Saxony
and the latter in the Ruhr. Industry in Saxony, consisting of mostly small
manufacturers of finished goods who relied heavily on export markets, pressed
for lower agricultural tariffs. In the Ruhr, large mining and metal firms strongly
supported high tariffs for both industry and agriculture.32
Thirdly, the competing interests of heavy and light industry splintered the
National Liberal party and the Left Liberal parties. The former, which was
permanently weakened in the late 1870s after losing its position as the
‘government party’, split on the question of tariffs as a result of the internal
divide between light and heavy industries.33 Its leaders subsequently refused
to include tariff policy as a party matter. Many authors have noted that the
(F’note continued)
of Germany 1815–1914, pp. 144–54; Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868–1879,
pp. 184–205; Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall, pp. 71–3.
29 Eley, ‘The British Model and the German Road’; Lawrence Schofer, The Formation of a
Modern Labour Force: Upper Silesia, 1865–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975),
pp. 78–101.
30 Dieter Fricke, Handbuch Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Arbeiter-Bewegung 1869 bis 1917
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1987).
31 None the less, unionization of heavy industry cannot be entirely overlooked. In the
Rhenish-Westphalian region (with approximately 22 per cent of Germany’s metal workers),
membership of the German Metalworkers’ Union (DMV) grew from 1 per cent in 1891, to 12 per
cent in 1900, and 20 per cent in 1912. In Brandenburg (including Berlin), with approximately 13
per cent of the nation’s metal workers, 3 per cent were DMV members in 1895, 35 per cent in 1907,
and 51 per cent in 1912 (Fricke, Handbuch Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Arbeiter-Bewegung 1869
bis 1917).
32 Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany, p. 140.
33 Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868–1879, pp. 209–11.
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National Liberals (and to some extent all liberal parties) lacked both a distinctive
social profile and a regional identity.34 This coincided with the National
Liberals’ claim to speak for the nation rather than for any particular group, but
it also meant that the liberals were unable to consolidate any electoral
strongholds (in contrast to, say, the Centre party that controlled the Catholic
rural districts35 and the Conservatives who held the agricultural regions east of
the Elbe). Socio-economic and regional diversity thereby weakened the political
party ‘focus’ of liberalism.36
The inter-industry conflict thesis suggests that while light industry (which
was more constrained by labour demands) was more free-trade oriented, heavy
industry sought a political alliance with agriculture that would both deliver high
industrial tariffs and squash demands for political reform.
HYPOTHESIS 3: A measure of the conflicting interests of light and heavy industry
should therefore be correlated with the voting patterns in the
Reichstag, with representatives of light industry favouring free trade
and representatives of heavy industry favouring protection.
The revisionists also argue that German liberals had multiple and conflicting
interests that inhibited their organization and political effectiveness.
HYPOTHESIS 4: We should thus find that an interests-based model of party affiliation
performs comparatively worse for the National Liberal Party and the
Left Liberal parties than for the Conservatives, the SPD and the
Centre parties.
A test of conflicting interests should not fail to control for one further factor
that divided late nineteenth-century German society – the Kulturkampf (the
34 Dieter Langewiesche, ‘German Liberalism in the Second Empire, 1871–1914’, in Konrad H.
Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones, eds, In Search of a Liberal Germany (Oxford: Berg, 1990); Gerhard
A. Ritter, ‘The Social Bases of the German Political Parties, 1867–1920’, in Karl Rohe, ed., Elections,
Parties and Political Traditions: Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems,
1867–1987 (Oxford: Berg, 1990); Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century,
pp. 160–241. In a recent work, Ju¨rgen R. Winkler (Sozialstruktur, Politische Traditionen und
Liberalismus: Eine Empirische La¨ngsschnittstudie Zur Wahlentwicklung in Deutschland 1871–1933
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995)) finds that the correlation between economic structure
(which he refers to as urbanization) and votes for liberals is non-existent. This article complements
Winkler’s study in at least three ways: (1) it offers an issue-specific examination of the role of the
liberal parties vis-a`-vis other parties; (2) the data provide a more highly specified configuration of
constituency interests (at the regional level) – particularly the contrast between agricultural and
industrial interests, and between light and heavy industry interests; and (3) the analysis links
constituency interests to policy making, through the use of roll-call analysis.
35 The Centre was clearly a denominational party: ‘In the elections from 1874 to 1887, the party
won, on average, two-thirds of all the votes in constituencies with clear Catholic majorities, whereas
it acquired fewer than 2 per cent of the votes in districts with clear Protestant majorities’ (Ritter, ‘The
Social Bases of the German Political Parties’, p. 35). Aside from Catholicism, however, the
socioeconomic base of the party was heterogenous, including workers, farmers, shop keepers, civil
servants, industrialists and aristocrats. Because farmers were over-represented (and industrialists
under-represented) in the Catholic population, the party tended to favour the interests of agriculture.
36 Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany, p. 141.
300 S C H O N H A R D T - B A I L E Y
culture struggle against Catholicism).37 Bismarck’s anti-Catholicism, and in
particular his campaign against the Centre (Catholic) party, greatly increased
the solidarity of German Catholics against the dominant Protestant population.
The link between this religious conflict and the marriage of iron and rye is not
explicit,38 and so, while I introduce it as a control variable, no hypothesis is
suggested for it.
Marriage from Factor Endowment
Rogowski develops a theory of political coalitions, or ‘cleavages’, that
highlights the importance of relative factor endowments.39 Rogowski’s theory
rests on the standard assumption of the Stolper–Samuelson (SS) theorem,40
namely that protection increases the real income of owners of the relatively
scarce factor(s) at the expense of owners of the relatively abundant factor(s).
For Germany, landowners and capitalists, as owners of relatively scarce factors
in the late 1870s, stood to gain from protection for agricultural and industrial
products,41 while labour, as the relatively abundant factor, stood to lose. The
marriage was consummated because owners of land and capital, and particularly
those who used these factors intensively relative to their use of labour,42 were
natural partners in an alliance against labour. However, the marriage began to
disintegrate when Germany became an advanced economy around 1890
(Rogowski regards the move to relative capital abundance as synonymous with
becoming an advanced economy), at which point capital became a loser from
protection under the standard SS analysis. The alliance structure then shifted
from one of class conflict (capital and land v. labour) to an urban–rural split
where capital and labour advocated free trade and landowners remained
protectionist.
A simple test of Rogowski’s theory is to consider whether it fits the pattern
of trade legislation in Germany. The story seems at first sight to fit the tariff
legislation of 1879 and the early 1890s. But, Rogowski emphasizes that after
37 Evans, The German Centre Party.
38 One possible link might be the struggle between the Centre party and the SPD over the
allegiance of Catholic workers (Nolan, Social Democracy and Society). Another might be the
demonstration effect of an industrial/agrarian alliance within the Centre party.
39 Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Alignments
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
40 Wolfgang F. Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, ‘Protection and Real Wages’ (reprinted in
American Economic Association, Readings in the Theory of International Trade (Philadelphia:
Blakiston, [1941] 1949)).
41 Rogowski argues that falling transportation costs in the 1870s opened East Elbian Germany to
foreign competition in grain, thereby making land a scarce factor relative to its abundance in the
United States.
42 The emphasis on the intensity of factor usage is important, and is a standard attribute of the
SS theorem. The most intensive users of a scarce factor will be the most protectionist, ceteris paribus.
Hence, in Germany, iron producers are expected to be more protectionist in the 1870s than, say, textile
producers who employed more labour per unit of output.
Parties and Interests in the ‘Marriage of Iron and Rye’ 301
1895 capital-intensive new industries (chemicals and electrical equipment) split
from the protectionist CVDI ‘to found the more free-trading Bund der
Industriellen; the wider industrial rebellion against high tariffs that underlay the
formation of the Hansabund a few years later; and, finally, the victory of the
low-tariff forces in the Reichstag elections a few years later.’43 ‘Later’ is very
much the right word, because Rogowski’s chronology skips over the resumption
of tariffs in 1902, attributing this to a ‘lag’.44 As long as one is willing to
disregard the high tariffs of the first decade of the new century, Rogowski’s
theory fares well!
We might also test the argument that the intensity of factor endowment in
particular industries or agricultural sectors determined alignments on trade
policy issues. But, according to Rogowski, in Germany highly capital intensive
industries opposed moderately capital intensive industries, while agrarians who
used land less intensively (dairy and meat producers) did not oppose the
agrarians who used land intensively (grain producers)..45 This begs the question,
when does factor intensity become great enough to create fissures among owners
and users of a given factor, and is the answer the same for capital and land? This
ambiguity complicates, but does not preclude, testing the effect of factor
intensity on trade interests. We may accept Rogowski’s designation of some
industries as highly capital-intensive (chemicals and electrical equipment),
some as moderately capital-intensive (metals) and some (textiles) as ‘the least
capital-intensive of industries’.46 We may then test whether representatives of
these respective industries pressed strongly, moderately or weakly for
protection before 1890, and strongly, moderately or weakly for free trade after
1890. In the absence of significant chemicals and electrical equipment industries
before 1890, a test of ‘pre’ and ‘post’ support must rest on metals and textiles
(which I measure more broadly as heavy and light industry), hypothesizing that
HYPOTHESIS 5: Representatives of heavy industry should be moderately supportive
of protection before 1890, and moderately supportive of free trade
after 1890.
Similarly,
HYPOTHESIS 6: The representatives of light industry should be weakly supportive
of protection before 1890, and weakly supportive of free trade
after 1890.
Taking on board Rogowski’s fall-back position of the ‘lag’ effect, we might
expect the ‘before 1890’ portion of Hypotheses 5 and 6 to hold, but anticipate
43 Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, p. 40.
44 In correspondence with the author (27 August 1994), Rogowski argues for the existence of ‘a
lag of about a generation between a country’s attainment of capital-abundance and its capitalists’
universal recognition of that abundance. The interim seems to be characterized by a lot of infighting’.
It remains unclear, however, how a ‘lag’ explains a move to free trade under Caprivi, and then a move
back to protection under Bu¨low. Surely the ‘lag’ argument would predict a delayed move to free trade.
45 Rogowski (Commerce and Coalitions) footnotes that ‘some northern German peasants’
supported free trade (p. 40).
46 Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, p. 163.
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no change to have occurred by 1902. A second test of factor intensity has already
been given in Hypothesis 1b. While Rogowski accepts the traditionalists’ notion
of agrarian unity, stronger support for protection by representatives of grain
producers (who used land intensively) than by representatives of cattle
producers (who used land less intensively) would lend support to his theory.
For easy reference, the six hypotheses from the three interests-based
interpretations are as follows:
Traditional
HYPOTHESIS 1: Agrarian unity should be reflected in (a) agrarian regions voting
predominantly for Conservative party representatives; and (b)
deputies from agrarian regions voting for agricultural protection
in the Reichstag.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Conservative party delegates in the Reichstag should consist-
ently and uniformly support high agricultural tariffs.
Revisionist
HYPOTHESIS 3: A measure of the conflicting interests of light and heavy industry
should be correlated with the voting patterns in the Reichstag,
with representatives of light industry favouring free trade and
representatives of heavy industry favouring protection.
HYPOTHESIS 4: We should find that an interests-based model of party affiliation
performs comparatively worse for the National Liberal party and
the Left Liberal parties than for the Conservatives, the SPD, and
the Centre parties.
Factor Endowment
HYPOTHESIS 5: Representatives of heavy industry should be moderately support-
ive of protection before 1890, and moderately supportive of free
trade after 1890.
HYPOTHESIS 6: Representatives of light industry should be weakly supportive
of protection before 1890, and weakly supportive of free trade
after 1890.
TESTING THE THEORIES
Hypotheses 1 through 6 are not exhaustive tests of each theory; rather, they test
some of the basic premises of the theories. I employ a variety of analytical tools
to test these hypotheses, including tabulations of votes by region and by party,
and conditional and binomial logistic regression.
My model of voting behaviour is illustrated in Figure 1. Constituents’
preferences (as measured by demographic features) influence the votes of their
representatives both directly (for example, deputies from urban areas will tend
to support workers’ interests), and indirectly, through the deputies’ party
affiliation. Arrow (c) reflects the direct effect, while arrows (a) and (b) reflect
the indirect effect. Residual effects are given by U and V, illustrating that the
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Fig. 1. A model of voting behaviour
model is probabilistic, not deterministic. The logic of the model stems from both
the sociological and psychological approaches to voting behaviour. Voters use
both sociological cues (religion, occupational groupings) and party ‘labels’ to
guide their choices47 (see Appendix). Deputies, seeking re-election, cast votes
in accordance with the interests of their constituents. However, deputies’ votes
also reflect an ideological component which is partially, but not wholly,
indicated by party affiliation. If a deputy ‘shirks’, he may do so either from party
loyalty (in which case the party stance conflicts with the interests of his
constituency, and he chooses party over constituency), or from some
independent ideological motivation (which may or may not coincide with his
party’s stance, but clearly conflicts with the interests of his constituency). My
model attempts to gauge whether deputies’ votes are consistent with the
characteristics of their constituencies, and whether the votes demonstrate party
loyalty. Using this model, I test the hypotheses against roll-call votes in the
Reichstag for four divisions.
The critical reader may argue that because Imperial Germany was ostensibly
‘authoritarian’, voting behaviour of members of the Reichstag was irrelevant for
government policy. Three responses may be offered. First, while deputies may
have reacted more than acted, and as a body had no legal control over the
Chancellor, Reichstag approval was none the less required for legislation. Most
of this legislation was limited to economic policy, which Bismarck encouraged
the Reichstag to consider. (Other areas of policy such as expanding
parliamentary power or military matters were virtually closed to debate in the
Reichstag).48 Although the Reichstag was circumscribed in its activities, it could
exert its authority over trade policy. Secondly, universal male suffrage, secret
and direct voting, and voting participation rates of 50 per cent (in 1871) rising
to 85 per cent (in 1907) suggest a democratic electoral system on a par with other
47 Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, ‘The Not So Simple Act of Voting’, in Ada Finifter,
ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline II (Washington, DC: American Political Science
Association, 1993), pp. 193–218.
48 Craig, Germany 1866–1945, pp. 45–6.
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European countries of the time.49 Thirdly, while the Junkers enjoyed
considerable political clout in policy decisions,50 their representatives in the
Reichstag did not vote as a monolithic bloc.
Regional Divisions
One way to analyse the direct effect of constituents’ interests on roll-call votes
(Figure 1, (c)) entails assessing how closely deputies’ votes matched the
interests of the regions containing their constituencies. Table 1 displays these
votes across the four divisions – two motions for higher tariffs (the 1879 and
1902 autonomous Tariff Laws)51 and two for lower tariffs (the 1893 and 1894
trade treaties). The table indicates that the western heavy industry regions
constituted a more cohesive voting bloc than the eastern agricultural regions.
In 1879 and 1902, support for protection was strong in the regions in which
metals and/or mining industries were important – Du¨sseldorf (Ruhr), Aachen,
Cologne, Trier and Koblenz, and Upper Silesia.52 In 1893 and 1894 heavy
industry in Ruhr and Aachen supported freer trade along with the trade-reliant
Hanse Cities and Berlin (the latter being the only consistent supporter of free
trade, whose deputies were of the SPD or Left Liberal parties).
Bavaria was the only highly agricultural region that was a consistently strong
supporter of protection. Although support for protection was reasonably strong
in the eastern regions (East and West Prussia and Posen) in 1879 and 1902,53
these regions were far less resistant to freer trade in 1893 and 1894.54 In the case
of the Russian Treaty this was most probably due to fears of war with Russia
since the eastern regions were particularly sensitive to their geographic
vulnerability. The regional split is less easily explained for the Romanian
Treaty.
49 Ritter, ‘The Social Bases of the German Political Parties’, p. 32.
50 Puhle, ‘Lords and Peasants in the Kaiserreich’; Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After
Bismarck’s Fall.
51 Unlike earlier divisions, the Reichstag voted on twenty-four different aspects of the 1902 Tariff
Law. The seventh division, used here, pertained specifically to the minimum tariff levels allowable
for grain.
52 In 1879 and 1902, the Ruhr had the largest percentage of workers in metals (9.3 per cent in
1879 and 14.6 per cent in 1902), and in 1879 it had the largest percentage in mining (13.1 per cent).
Other important mining regions were Upper Silesia (which overtook Ruhr in 1902 by employing 16
per cent of its workforce in mining), Trier and Koblenz, and Aachen (both employing more than 5
per cent in mining).
53 Voting by the Polish members of the Reichstag accounts for a good deal of the lack of support
for protection in these regions. In 1879, six Poles from Posen and four from East and West Prussia
voted against the tariffs. In 1902, the Poles from Posen were split – six abstained and four voted for
higher protection. The split was also evident in East and West Prussia, where three Poles abstained
and one from West Prussia voted for protection.
54 In 1879, East and West Prussia, Bavaria and Posen were the most agricultural regions, with
over 60 per cent of regional employment in agriculture. In 1902, only Posen remained above 60 per
cent, while East Prussia exceeded 55 per cent and Bavaria, Pomerania and West Prussia exceeded
50 per cent.
Parties and Interests in the ‘Marriage of Iron and Rye’ 307
The traditionalists’ emphasis on agrarian unity (Hypothesis 1(b)) is thus not
as well supported as might be expected. The heavy industry voting bloc provides
only partial support for the divided interests and the factor endowment
approaches (Hypotheses 3 and 5). Representatives of heavy industry did indeed
favour protection in 1879 and 1902, but not in the 1890s (as the divided interests
approach would have us believe). Moreover, heavy industry’s strong support for
protection in 1902 does not bode well for the factor endowment model.
Parties and Voting Behaviour
Table 1 provides useful information on the distribution of support for protection,
but it ignores a vital political component – the effect of party affiliation on voting
behaviour (Figure 1, (b)). German party affiliation is not an easy variable to
measure: during the period from 1879 to 1902, no less than twenty-six different
party affiliations appear for members of the Reichstag, not including the bei
keiner Fraktion (with no party affiliation, or nonpartisan) members).55
Following standard groupings in the secondary literature, I reduce these to six
major groups of parties: (1) the Conservatives (the Deutsch-Konservative Partei
and the Reichspartei, or Freikonservativen); (2) the National Liberals
(Nationalliberale Partei); (3) the Centre (Zentrum); (4) the Minorities (for 1879,
1893 and 1894, these included only the Poles, but for 1902 also included five
members of the Deutsche-Hannoversche Partei; (5) the Left Liberals (Linkslib-
erale);56 and (6) the SPD, or Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands). In all four divisions, these six groups accounted for approxi-
mately 90 per cent of the members who voted.
Cross-tabulations of these party groups and the votes (Table 2) reveal strong
party allegiances in 1879, but a weakening of these allegiances thereafter –
particularly for the Conservatives. In 1879, all the party groupings except the
National Liberals voted almost perfectly along party lines. The Conservatives
and Centre voted for protection, while the Poles, the Social Democrats, and all
but one of the Left Liberals voted against the tariffs. While most of the National
Liberals voted against the tariffs, about a quarter voted with the government for
protection. In 1893 and 1894, the Conservatives, the Centre and the National
Liberals were all internally divided. Most of the Conservatives favoured
protection (although more defected to freer trade with the Russian Treaty) and
most of the National Liberals supported the trade treaties, while the Centre was
almost evenly divided. The Left Liberals, the Poles and the Social Democrats
all supported the treaties. In 1902, the Conservatives, the National Liberals and
55 Max Schwarz, MdR, Biographisches Handbuch der Reichstage (Hanover: Verlag fu¨r Literatur
und Zeitgeschehen GmbH, 1965); Stenographische Berichte u¨ber die Verhandlungen des Reichstags
(Berlin: Verlag der Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlags-Anstalt, various years.
56 These included for 1879, the Liberale Vereinigung, the Fortschrittspartei, and the Deutsche
Volkspartei; for 1893 and 1894, the Deutsche Freisinnige Volkspartei and the Freisinnige
Vereinigung; and for 1902, the Deutsche Freisinnige Volkspartei, the Deutsche Fortschrittliche
Volkspartei, the Deutsche Volkspartei, the Fortschrittspartei and the Freisinnige Vereinigung.
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the Left Liberals were all internally divided, although most Conservatives and
National Liberals favoured higher tariffs and the vast majority of the Left
Liberals opposed them. The Minorities (Poles plus the German Hanover party)
shifted from their earlier free trade stance to support higher tariffs. All of the
Centre voted for protection and all but one of the Social Democrats voted against
the higher tariffs.
It is clear that party affiliation mattered more for some parties than for others
and that for all parties (except the SPD), party unity varied over time. In sum,
party affiliation and regional interests each capture part of the variation in voting
behaviour. Any model of Reichstag voting must therefore incorporate both these
two factors.
The Regression Model
One way to measure the relationships between (1) the economic composition
of members’ constituencies, (2) members’ party affiliation, and (3) votes on
trade policy in the Reichstag, is to estimate a log-linear model. Log-linear
analysis would not, however, incorporate interval-level data on the economic
composition of each region. Since this information is useful for testing the six
hypotheses, I instead employ conditional and binomial logistic regression.
Measures of constituency characteristics. For simplicity, and to minimize
problems of multicollinearity, I use five measures for constituency characteris-
tics, all measured at the regional level for years near to 1879, 1893/4 and 1902.57
Agrarian unity is tested with two variables: (1) the number of hectares (’000s)
in the region used for growing wheat and rye; and (2) the number of cows (and
pigs for 1893, 1894 and 1902) in the region (’000s).58 Hypothesis 1 predicts that
representatives from agricultural regions will support protection, and that this
support will not differ substantially between representatives from grain
producing and animal husbandry areas. Contrary evidence would weaken the
traditional approach and strengthen the factor endowment approach. Employ-
ment data are taken as indicators of the interests of light and heavy industry.
Light industry measures the percentage of workers in the region employed in
the production of textiles, clothing, wood products, leather and printing. Heavy
industry measures the percentage of workers in the region employed in
57 The agriculture and religion variables are from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt., Statistisches
Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mu¨hlbrecht) for 1878/79, 1892 and 1902.
Data for light and heavy industry are from Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic Development
of Germany, using the years 1882, 1895 and 1907. Data limitations are discussed in the Appendix.
58 In preliminary analysis, a simple dummy variable for East Elbian regions was used to
differentiate grain producers from producers of other agricultural goods. This variable yielded very
similar results (for both the conditional and binomial logistic models) to those for the two variables
described in the text. I also tested whether wheat and rye yields (indexed by the national average
yield and weighted by the share of acreage given to each crop in the region) affected party affiliation
of deputy or support for protection. This variable performed poorly and was dropped.
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metalworking, machinery, mining and quarrying.59 Hypothesis 3 predicts that
representatives of light industry interests will support free trade and represen-
tatives of heavy industry will support protection. Evidence of a clear split in
these interests would be consistent with the divided interests approach.
Hypothesis 5 predicts a shift in heavy industry’s support from protection to free
trade, while Hypothesis 6 predicts a similar, but notably weaker, shift in support
from light industry.60 Evidence to the contrary would weaken the factor
endowment approach. Finally, the percentage of the Catholic population in each
region is included as a control variable (as discussed earlier).
Predicting party affiliation. Arrow (a) in Figure 1 indicates that voters’ choices
are in part a function of socioeconomic features of the constituency. To test this
formally, I use the five variables for constituency characteristics to estimate
party affiliation. The constituency variables are measured at the interval-level
and the dependent variable consists of the six party groups. (For reasons
explained in the Appendix, two party-specific variables are also included.) I use
a conditional logit model, since common regression models like OLS or logit
are inappropriate for models with multiple non-ordered categories for the
dependent variable.61 Unlike binomial logit, where the dependent variable is
normally coded 0 or 1, in conditional logit it normally begins with 1 rather than
0 and continues to K levels. The codes for party affiliation are, SPD (1), Left
Liberal (2), Minorities (3), Centre (4), National Liberal (5), and Conservative
(6) (K 5 6). The ordering of the categories is irrelevant, except for the baseline
category which should, ideally, reflect a ‘natural’ base category (if one exists)
and/or have the largest number of cases. The Conservatives were chosen as the
category most approximating these criteria. The baseline category is the
reference category for a series of binomial logits (or submodels for each
category against the baseline category) that are estimated simultaneously.
Estimates are generated for K 2 1 sub-models (here 5), and thus can be far from
simple to interpret. These coefficients and significance tests are reported in
Tables 3–5. The tables also report various measures of good fit, including the
percentages correctly predicted, the log-likelihood ratio and McFadden’s r2, a
pseudo R2 value.62
59 Clay and mining are grouped with metals as industries that formed the nucleus of the CVDI
(Eley, ‘The British Model and the German Road’, p. 106).
60 Elsewhere I explore the effects of geographic concentration of industry interests on support for
protection in the marriage of iron and rye (‘Sorting the Wheat from the Chaff: The “Marriage of Iron
and Rye” Revisited’ (unpublished working paper, London School of Economics and Political
Science, 1994); and also, Modelling Ideology and Interests: Agricultural Trade in Britain and
Germany, forthcoming).
61 Alan Agresti, Categorical Data Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1990). For further explanation of
conditional logit, and how it differs from multinomial logit, see the Appendix.
62 Pseudo R2s are often criticized, however (John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear
Probability, Logit, and Probit Models (London: Sage, 1984).
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The party-specific variables perform poorly in all three regressions.63 On the
whole, the remaining variables provide a reasonable fit for party choice (on
average, 39 per cent correctly predicted), but with some clear exceptions. Small
numbers of Social Democrats and Minorities create severe multicollinearity
problems for those two submodels in 1879 and 1894 (Tables 3 and 4), making
interpretation of these coefficients inadvisable. By contrast, economic interests
explain quite large percentages of the Centre and Conservatives. Both liberal
parties are less well predicted by an interests-based model, lending support to
the divided interests approach (Hypothesis 4) which suggests that the liberals
lacked a socio-economic profile.
The significance and sign of each predictor varies markedly from party to
party, but one theme is conspicuous. The emphasis of the traditionalists on
agrarian unity (Hypothesis 1 (a)) is not warranted by the evidence. A clear split
between grain and animal producers is evident for the Left Liberal, Centre and
National Liberal submodels. Grain producing constituencies consistently voted
Conservative while animal producing constituencies consistently voted against
the Conservatives. A derivative table provides another way to look at the
influence of these two variables (Table 6).64 (I do not present the derivative
tables for 1879 and 1894, since the multicollinearity problems mentioned above
would distort the averages.) When the grain producing area increased by 1,000
hectares (one unit), the probability of returning a Conservative deputy increased
by 0.0008, while the probability of returning a National Liberal decreased by
2 0.0005 (and so on, for each party). Similarly, when the number of cows and
pigs increased by 1,000, the probability of returning a Conservative deputy
decreased by 2 0.0002. To illustrate, compare East Prussia with Baden. In 1900,
East Prussia had about 543,000 hectares of grain-producing area and
approximately 1,904,000 cows and pigs. For Baden, the numbers approximated
87,000 and 4,823,000, respectively. Thus, while its large grain area increased
the probability of East Prussia returning a Conservative deputy by 0.43, animal
husbandry decreased the probability by 2 0.38 (ceteris paribus). Baden’s
relatively small grain area increased the probability of returning a Conservative
by only 0.07, while its specialism in animal husbandry decreased the probability
of returning a Conservative by 2 0.96 (ceteris paribus). Not surprisingly, in
63 This suggests that the ‘problem’ of IIA discussed in the Appendix is probably overstated.
Indeed, removing the party-specific variables (and thereby reverting to standard multinomial logit)
barely affects the remaining coefficients. Thus, estimation based on an assumption of equal choice
probabilities (PSDP 5 PLL 5 PM 5 PZ 5 PNL 5 PDK 5 16 ) is unlikely to be far from the mark.64 A derivative table tells how the probabilities of each of the outcomes change in response to a
change in the covariate values. For example, when the percentage of Catholics (% Catholics)
increases by one, the probability of voting Catholic goes up by 0.68, while the probability of voting
Conservative goes down by 0.29 (and so on, with each category of party). The sum of the entries
in each row is zero since an increase in the probability of one category is offset by a decrease in another
category. The constant provides no useful interpretation and so is not presented in Table 6. The table
allows one to observe how the probabilites of the parties change as values of the independent variables
change. (For further details, see Dan Steinberg and Phillip Colla, Logit: A Supplementary Module
for SYSTAT (Evanston, Ill.: Systat Inc., 1991)
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1902, fifteen of East Prussia’s twenty-three deputies were Conservatives, while
none of Baden’s deputies were Conservatives.
In sum, constituency characteristics predict a good portion of deputies’ party
affiliation, but on average 61 per cent cannot be predicted. That is, nearly
two-thirds of party affiliation is ‘independent’ of what the literature has
identified as key constituency characteristics.
Predicting voting behaviour. If the constituency interests model perfectly, or
almost perfectly, predicts deputies’ party affiliation, a reduced form equation
should be used for predicting the vote.65 However, Tables 3–5 suggest that 61
per cent of deputies’ party affiliation cannot be explained by constituency
characteristics, and therefore a two-stage estimation is inappropriate. Instead,
I present three models for roll-call voting behaviour – measuring the effects of:
(1) constituency characteristics (entitled ‘Economic Interests Only’); (2)
political party affiliation; and (3) party affiliation and constituency interests
combined. The last model attempts to capture both paths indicated in Figure 1,
while the first and second represent arrows (c) and (b) exclusively. Although
collinearity between parties and interests lowers the efficiency of the estimators,
with the consequences evident in significance tests, the estimates are fairly
robust. Tables 7–10 present results using the three models for roll-call votes in
1879, 1893, 1894 and 1902, while Figures 2–5 illustrate the distributions of the
predicted probabilities. Only the parties that divided are included as dummy
variables (see Table 2). Parties that voted unanimously (excluding abstentions)
are excluded from this analysis since party affiliation perfectly predicts their
votes. The only party group excluded from all of the divisions is Minorities; all
other parties divided over at least one vote.
Fig. 2. Distribution of predicted probabilities (1879)
65 A reduced form equation would endogenize party affiliation, so that the exogenous component
of party affiliation would not be estimated (Gordon Hilton, Intermediate Politometrics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976); Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for
Social Scientists (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1977)).
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Figures 2–5 provide an intuitive ‘feel’ for how the combined model improves
upon the interests-only model. (The parties-only model has no distribution to
illustrate, since all party members are assigned identical probabilities. That is,
for each party, a fixed point – rather than a spread of points – is predicted for
all party members, regardless of the economic make-up of their constituencies.
In contrast, it is the economic make-up of the constituencies that defines the
spread of probabilities for the interests-only model. Thus, I report single-point
estimates for the parties-only model.) Box and whiskers plots,66 grouped by
party, show the spread of probabilities of voting for the legislation that each
model predicts. A good fit is graphically illustrated by a narrow box (hinge
spread), short whiskers (lines extending to the largest and smallest values that
are not outliers), and few outliers (solid circles indicating outside values, and
open circles far outside values). Moreover, greater certainty in predicting
deputies’ votes is illustrated by boxes clustered towards the far left (low
probability) or the far right (high probability). In 1879, the parties-only model
estimates that the probability of voting for the tariff was 0.042 for Left Liberals
and 0.235 for National Liberals. The interests plot illustrates the effect of
constituency interests on vote prediction, while the combined plot illustrates the
joint effect of party affiliation and constituency interests on vote prediction. The
combined model improves upon the interests model most dramatically for the
Left Liberals, while only a marginal improvement is obtained for the National
Liberals. This finding underscores the divisiveness within the National Liberal
party (hence the wider spread of the predicted votes) relative to the more united
stance of the Left Liberals. In 1893 and 1894, the parties-only model (not shown
here) estimates that the probabilities of the Centre (Zentrum), National Liberals
and Conservatives supporting the trade treaties were (respectively) 0.473, 0.717,
and 0.102, for 1893, and 0.536, 0.673, and 0.169 for 1894 (meaning that party
affiliation alone would predict strong support for the treaties from the National
Liberals, moderate support from the Centre, and very weak support from the
Conservatives).
Turning to Figures 3 and 4, the combined model improves upon the interests
model particularly well for the Conservatives, less well for the National
Liberals, and only marginally for the Centre. Thus, to rely solely on party
affiliation to predict Reichstag votes, one would ignore the variability that arises
within parties as members represent different regional interests. The particularly
wide box for the Centre party in the interests model reflects its broad
socio-economic constituency base, and its continued spread in the combined
model illustrates that party cohesion was insufficient to overcome the regional
differences. Contrast this with the Conservatives who, based on constituency
interests, were moderately spread around the anti-free trade position. Yet, by
66 David Knoke and George W. Bohrnstedt, Statistics for Social Data Analysis (Itasca: F.E.
Peacock, 1994).
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Fig. 3. Distribution of predicted probabilities (1893)
Fig. 4. Distribution of predicted probabilities (1894)
adding party affiliation to constituency interests (the combined model), one
observes a dramatic consolidation of the predicted vote spread around a lower
probability. The vote spread does not, however, disappear – as it would if one
relied solely on party affiliation to predict the vote. To reiterate, neither interests
nor party affiliation alone provide an adequate predictor of the legislative vote;
moreover, a combined approach allows one to observe the different weights of
these two variables across parties. In 1902, the parties-only model estimates that
the probability of voting for the tariff was 0.023 for the SPD, 0.820 for the
National Liberals, 0.154 for the Left Liberals, and 0.8 for the Conservatives
(indicating strong support from the National Liberals and Conservatives and
extremely weak support from the SPD and Left Liberals). The contrast between
the interests-only and the combined models is quite stark. The combined model
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demonstrates that party affiliation vastly improves certainty in modelling vote
choice. One might be tempted to ignore constituency interests in this vote, given
the strong influence of party affiliation in consolidating the predicted
probabilities. However, to do so would miss the interests-based variability that
remained within both the National Liberal and the Conservative parties.
Contrast this with the virtually non-existent vote spread for the SPD and the Left
Liberals in the combined model. This model illustrates the stronger ideological
commitment to the party stance within these two parties.
Tables 7–10 specify the fit of each model. In each division the combined
model increases the percentage of cases correctly predicted. The parties and the
interests models predict roughly the same percentages of cases, except in 1902
when party affiliation predicts 73.5 per cent of the votes, interests predict 54.4
per cent, and together they predict 79.6 per cent. The success index allows us
to specify how much the estimated model improves upon a purely random
model.67 In 1879 the improvement from each of the three models is considerably
greater for the protectionist vote than for the freer trade vote. In the remaining
divisions, the improvement from the models is more balanced between the
protectionists and the freer traders. All measures of fit indicate that party
affiliation and interests (together) predict the 1902 vote quite well, and the
Russian treaty (1894) least well. Arguably, the strategic implications of trade
with Russia constituted an important omitted variable (given in Figure 1 to U).
The regression estimates suggest that each of the theoretical approaches
captures part of the story, but none tells all. The cracks in the agrarian alliance
seen in Table 1 are also evident in the estimates. In 1879 and 1902, no significant
difference is evident between grain and animal producers. In 1893 and 1894,
however, representatives of grain producers opposed lower tariffs while the
Fig. 5. Distribution of predicted probabilities (1902).
67 That is, a model with only a constant.
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representatives of animal producers favoured freer trade. Hypothesis 1b is thus
supported for the years of autonomous tariff legislation, but not for the Caprivi
years. This is, perhaps, clear evidence for the traditionalists’ claim that the
Caprivi’s trade reforms were an anomalous period. Historians who fault the
traditionalists for overemphasizing agrarian unity might, by contrast, point to
the split between grain and animal producers in the Caprivi years as evidence
of disunity within the agrarian movement. Both factions within the traditionalist
camp would probably agree that agrarian unity was strongest in 1879 (not 1902,
despite the activities of the Farmers’ League), since only then did the
Conservatives vote unanimously for protection. In 1893, 1894 and 1902, the
Conservative party dummy (in the combined model) none the less confirms a
strong pro-protection stance amongst most of its deputies, thereby supporting
Hypothesis 2. In brief, while newer historians might stress agrarian disunity,
Conservative party delegates overwhelmingly supported high agricultural
tariffs across all four divisions.
The findings for Hypotheses 3, 5 and 6 (which all relate to the interests of
heavy and light industry) give greater weight to the factor endowment than the
divided interests approach. In 1879 neither the light nor heavy industry
coefficient is significant, although both are positively signed. For 1879 only, two
additional measures could be calculated for heavy industry by region: (1) value
(in current marks) for primary production of all metals (casting and smelting);
and (2) value (in current marks) for iron mining output. Substituting these
measures for heavy industry produced positive signs for both the new measure
and for light industry. For the regression with the ‘all metals’ variable, both
industry variables were significant at 5 per cent, while with the ‘iron mining’
variable the new measure was significant at 10 per cent, but light industry was
not significant. Consistency in these findings suggests that no observable
difference existed between the representatives of light and heavy industry in
1879. For the later divisions, both light and heavy industry coefficients are
significant. In 1893 and 1894, representatives of heavy industry voted in favour
of the freer trade treaties, while in 1902, these representatives reverted to
favouring tariff protection. Representatives of light industry opposed freer trade
in the 1890s, and also opposed tariff protection in 1902. While the interests
certainly appear to be divided, the signs for the 1890s are opposite to the ones
predicted by the divided interests approach. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not
supported (except for 1902). According to the factor endowment theory, heavy
industry should moderately (and light industry weakly) support protection in
1879, and moderately (weakly) support free trade in the 1890s and 1902. The
findings for 1879 are as expected. The signs for heavy industry in the 1890s bear
out the expectation, but 1902 confounds it. Conversely, the representatives of
light industry vote as predicted in 1902, but not in the 1890s. The factor
endowment theory rightly captures a shift between the pre- and post-1890 years,
but cannot explain the protectionist stance of light industry in the 1890s, nor the
resumed enthusiasm for protection by heavy industry in 1902.
In sum, the traditional view correctly emphasizes the Conservatives as the
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party of the agrarians; the divided interests view rightly notes that the liberal
reform movement lacked a socio-economic base of support; and the factor
endowment theory captures the shift in interests that occurred as Germany’s
economy advanced. Yet, the traditionalists exaggerate German agrarian unity;
the divided interests approach overemphasizes the cleavages between light and
heavy industry, and (perhaps as a result) fails to capture the fluidity of industry’s
interests as the German economy developed; and the factor endowment theory
ignores heavy industry’s renewed support for protection in 1902.
DISCUSSION
The three interpretations of the marriage demonstrate a progression in theory
on German political economy. In the late 1920s, Kehr rebuked contemporary
German historiography, which argued that statesmen were ‘motivated by a
rationally defensible concept of national interest’.68 Kehr’s socio-economic
framework suggested that the tariffs of 1879 and 1902 were both integral to
anti-socialist strategies. While Bismarck attempted to destroy the socialist threat
by legislative fiat, Bu¨low sought to transfer the attention of the proletariat away
from domestic concerns to foreign policy (Sammlungspolitik). Gerschenkron
built upon Kehr’s work by contributing a deeper understanding of the economic
interests of the two coalition partners. In contrast, the divided interests approach
has questioned the simplicity of the traditional interpretation, arguing that
industrialists were neither as monolithic nor as subservient as suggested. Light
industry generally supported free trade, and heavy industry supported
protectionism. One reason for this divided stance was that socialism affected
heavy and light industry differently, with the former industry in a stronger
defensive position than the latter. On one point, however, the traditional and
divided interests approaches agree – that Caprivi’s reforms, which split the
marriage, were a historic anomaly.
More recently, Rogowski has provided an explanation which incorporates
the disintegration of the marriage in the 1890s into a theoretical framework.
Rogowski argues that Germany followed a predictable pattern of coalition
formation; it was not an historically unique case of political development, as
suggested by the traditionalists and revisionists. His rational choice framework
allows one to set aside the specific historical context in favour of a generalizable
theory of political alignments. Whereas previous interpretations portray a static
marriage punctuated by a rift in the early 1890s, Rogowski’s theory introduces
a dynamism into the interests of the partners, as well as the factions within them.
As Germany’s economy became advanced (as evidenced by its relative factor
endowment), the interests of factor owners changed and the marriage began to
disintegrate. However, theoretical elegance has its price: Rogowski is forced to
dismiss the anomalous resumption of high tariffs of 1902 as a ‘lag’, and in so
68 Craig, in Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy, p. x.
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doing he misses the intensity of class conflict which defines German political
development in the early twentieth century.
The evidence in this article suggests a middle ground between the
socio-economic perspective of the traditionalists and revisionists, and
Rogowski’s rational choice framework – a middle ground that compromises
some of the elegance of factor endowment theory in order to capture important
political anomalies of the German case. The two anomalies – the protectionist
stance of light industry in the 1890s and the renewed support for protection by
heavy industry in 1902 – can be explained easily by reintroducing insights
gained from the traditionalists and revisionists. Within Rogowski’s long-run
time frame, during which capital shifted from protectionism to free trade, is a
short-run time frame of about ten years, during which social forces mitigated
the impact of this shift in economic interests. Light industry supported
protectionism in the early 1890s because the SPD and the free trade unions were
not yet firmly embedded in it. After the Anti-Socialist legislation was abandoned
and the Subversion Bill of 1896 failed, the SPD and the free trade unions were
essentially unhindered in their growth,69 particularly within light industry. Light
industry’s support for free trade in 1902 is consistent both with the divided
interests and the factor endowment models, a finding one may attribute either
to increased exposure to labour’s demands or to relative capital abundance.
Heavy industry’s renewed support for protection in 1902 is persuasive evidence
of reactionary anti-socialism, but is overlooked by Rogowski’s long-run theory.
The cleavage in interests predicted by Rogowski eventually emerges, but an
interesting and important short-run dimension is lost before reaching that
eventuality. While my findings lend some weight to the factor endowment
model, they also caution us against dismissing entirely the socio-economic
context of German development. Bluntly stated, factor ownership may yield an
accurate long-run explanation, but to account for short-run ‘lags’, one must
consider political-ideological motivations.
In analysing the mix between economic interests and ideological motivations,
this study has also explored the effects of both constituents’ interests and
representatives’ political party affiliation on roll-call votes. Most authors focus
on the direct effect of constituents’ interests (arrow (c), Figure 1). Here, I shed
new light on the indirect effect of constituents interests on roll-call votes (arrows
(a) and (b)). The conditional logistic regression estimates suggest that the link
between constituency interests and parties was strongest for the Conservatives
and Centre, weaker for the SPD, and weakest for the liberal parties.
Conservative and Centre deputies apparently had less scope for shirking
(suggesting a stronger indirect effect of constituency interests on Conservative
and Centre votes), and the liberal and SPD deputies greater scope (suggesting
69 Between 1890 and 1903, the SPD’s national vote share rose from 19.7 per cent to 31.7 per cent;
its share of Reichstag deputies rose from 8.8 per cent to 20.4 per cent (W. L. Guttsman, The German
Social Democratic Party, 1875–1933 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).
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a weaker indirect effect on these deputies’ votes). Table 2 suggests that the
SPD and the Left Liberals exploited the weaker constituency link with party
unity in voting. In sum, interests were felt most strongly through the
Conservatives and Centre, while political party ideology was felt most strongly
through the SPD and the Left Liberals. For the Conservatives, interests mattered
more after 1879, while the ideology of the SPD and Left Liberals lasted through
the entire period.
APPENDIX
The Model
Arrow (a) in Figure 1 requires some explication of the underlying modelling assumptions. I
first assume that constituency n selects a candidate from party i, where i is one alternative from
set Jn.70 I then assume that constituencies have six party choices – Social Democrats, Left
Liberals, Minorities, Centre, National Liberals or Conservatives. The probability that
constituency n chooses party i from set Jn (call this Pin) is a function of the characteristics of
alternative i compared with the other alternatives (call this zin relative to all zjn for j in Jn, j Þ i)
and certain characteristics of the region in which the constituency is located (sn). Thus,
Pin 5 f (zin; zjn for all j Þ i, sn, b, d),
where b and d specify vectors of estimated parameters.
In choosing one party over the others, the constituency is assumed to maximize its utility,
Uin, part of which is observable (Win) and part of which is given to random variation (ein). Thus,
Uin 5 Win 1 ein.
Let Win comprise the functional components of Pin, so that
Win 5 zinb 1 sndi.
Win is thus assumed to be a function of both the characteristics of the party (zin) and the region
in which the constituency is situated (sn). Parameter b is estimated for the characteristics of
the party and parameter di is estimated for the characteristics of the region/constituency. The
subscript i indicates that the effects of regional characteristics vary across the parties.
The mixed, or conditional logit model follows the general multinomial logit model, but
contains both characteristics of the constituencies/regions and characteristics of the parties. The
conditional logit model is designed to overcome overestimation and underestimation of
probabilities that might arise from the independence from irrelevant alternatives property (IIA)
exhibited by logit probabilities.71 It follows the form of logit models, thus allowing the
70 To avoid confusion, I follow the standard notation for the multinomial model, which subscripts
J with n. The subscript in this case would indicate that different constituencies might face parties
with different characteristics. For illustration, let ideology be a characteristic of the alternatives. Some
parties were very conservative, some were very liberal and some were neither very conservative nor
very liberal. A conservative constituency might then assign utility weights to the ideology
characteristic of each of the parties that would differ from the weights assigned by a liberal
constituency. However, since it is impossible to know such a weighting scheme for each constituency,
I assume a common (and very simple) weighting scheme for the attributes of the parties (see text
of Appendix).
71 The model is McFadden’s ‘conditional’ logit model (also known as the ‘Mother Logit’ (Kenneth
Train, Qualitative Choice Analysis: Theory, Econometrics, and an Application to Automobile
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Demand (London: MIT Press, 1986)). McFadden (Daniel McFadden, ‘Conditional Logit Analysis
of Qualitative Choice Behavior’, in P. Zarembka, ed., Frontiers in Econometrics (New York:
Academic Press, 1974); McFadden, ‘Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models’, in Zvi
Griliches and Michael D. Intriligator, eds, Handbook of Econometrics, vol. II (Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1984); McFadden, ‘Qualitative Response Models’, in Werner Hildenbrand, ed.,
Advances in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) has shown that the
property of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) (which, by assuming that each
alternative is independent from alternatives other than the reference alternative, can overestimate the
probability of some alternatives and underestimate the probability of others) can be corrected to give
the true probabilities, with an appropriate specification of Win. Other statisticians (Train, Qualitative
Choice Analysis, pp. 21–4; and Agresti, Categorical Data Analysis, pp. 316–17) have generally
agreed with this assessment. (Additionally, Train has noted that the inclusion of alternative-specific
constants – which I include in my model – ‘can mitigate, and in some cases remove, inaccuracies
due to logit’s independence of irrelevant alternatives property’ (p. 25).)
The problem of IIA and the remedy adopted in this article may be interpreted as follows. The
estimation procedure in standard multinomial logit (MNL) calculates a series of binary logits (SPD
versus Conservatives (DK), Left Liberals (LL) versus Conservatives, Minorities (M) versus
Conservatives, Centre (Z) versus Conservatives, National Liberals (NL) versus Conservatives).
In each of these calculations, the ratio of each two probabilities (for example, SPD versus
Conservatives) is assumed not to depend on any other alternatives (in this case, the Left Liberals,
Minorities, Centre or National Liberals). MNL thus assumes that the choice probabilities are equal
and sum to one (that is, PSDP 5 PLL 5 PM 5 PZ 5 PNL 5 PDK 5 16). Consequently, if the true choice
probabilities reflected three groupings – say, (1) SPD or LL; (2) M, Z or NL; and (3) DK – with
equal probabilities (PSDP 5 PLL 5 16 and PM 5 PZ 5 PNL 5 19 and PDK 5 13), the assumed choice
probabilities would underestimate some party choices (DK) and overestimate others (M, Z and
NL). If, however, Win depends on characteristics of alternatives other than i and k (where k is the
reference category, or Conservatives), the model need not exhibit IIA. Two characteristics of the
alternatives are likely to be relevant to constituencies choosing a representative – ideology and
religion.
An alternative functional form, multinomial probit (MNP), might have been used to estimate party
choice. MNP, too, has its disadvantages, notably the computational difficulty in estimating five or
more alternatives (McFadden, ‘Qualitative Response Models’). McFadden (‘Econometric Analysis
of Qualitative Response Models’) finds that ‘the multinomial logit model scores well on simplicity
and computation, but poorly on flexibility. The multinomial probit model is simple and flexible, but
scores poorly on computation. Variants of these models, the nested multinomial logit model and the
factorial multinomial probit model, attempt to achieve both flexibility and computational
practicality’. Others are wary of using probit since it requires one to assume a normal distribution
for the cumulative density function. In the absence of any strong justification for the normality
assumption in one’s application, logit is the preferred estimation technique (Edward D. Lawrence
and Nasser Arshadi, ‘A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Problem Loan Resolution Choices in
Banking’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 27 (1995), 202–16).
Some political scientists (R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, ‘Correlated Disturbances in
Discrete Choice Models: A Comparison of Multinomial Probit Models and Logit Models’ (California
Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 914, 1994); Alvarez and Nagler, ‘Economics
Issues and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election’, American Journal
of Political Science, 39 (1995), 714–44) have argued strongly in favour of the use of MNP, in view
of the IIA problem in standard MNL. In spite of their praise of MNP, they note that it too has several
undesirable features (the estimation difficulties noted by McFadden and unusually large standard
errors of the coefficient estimates, to name just two). They conclude that conditional logit may
provide reasonable estimates, particularly when the research is not concerned with the effect of
adding or removing an alternative from the choice set. (Here, the choice set remains constant at six
across all the years. Addition or deletion of party choices is not a concern of this article.)
